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I. GLOBALIZATION AND THE NEW LEX MERCATORIA

The globalization and internationalization of the economy1 entail a need for
unified laws.2 In a globalized market, the interactions between businesses and
people from different states require that international trade be governed by
uniform rules. This unification of legal systems is achieved in a variety of ways.
One method is the process of conventional uniformization, which recognizes
the preeminent role of the state, albeit in a relationship of interstate cooperation.

*
Ph.D. in Italian and European Constitutional Law and Researcher at the Institute for the Study of
Regionalism and Self Government (“ISSiRFA”) of the National Research Council (“CNR”) in Rome.
Email address: gabriella.saputelli@cnr.it.
1
On the history of globalization, see JÜRGEN OSTERHAMMEL & NIELS P. PETERSSON,
GLOBALIZATION: A SHORT HISTORY, (Dona Geyer trans., 2009).There is a vast literature on
globalization. See, e.g., ULRICH BECK, CHE COS’È LA GLOBALIZZAZIONE: RISCHI E PROSPETTIVE DELLA
SOCIETÀ PLANETARIA (1999); IAN CLARK, GLOBALIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION: INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1997) (discussing the history and impact of globalization);
ANTHONY GIDDENS, EUROPE IN THE GLOBAL AGE (2006); DAVID HELD, GOVERNARE LA
GLOBALIZZAZIONE: UN’ALTERNATIVA DEMOCRATICA AL MONDO UNIPOLARE (2005); AMARTYA K.
SEN, GLOBALIZZAZIONE E LIBERTÀ (G. Bono trans., 2003); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND
ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZZAZIONE (2011); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING
GLOBALIZATION WORK (2006); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ ET AL., THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE STATE (Arnold
Heertje ed., 1989).
2
See for example, SABINO CASSESE, LO SPAZIO GIURIDICO GLOBALE (2003); MARCO D’ALBERTI,
POTERI PUBBLICI, MERCATI E GLOBALIZZAZIONE (2008); YVES DEZALAY, I MERCANTI DEL DIRITTO
(1997); NATALINO IRTI, L’ORDINE GIURIDICO DEL MERCATO (1998); FRANCESCO GALGANO & FABRIZIO
MARRELLA, DIRITTO E PRASSI DEL COMMERCIO INTERNAZIONALE (2010); FRANCESCO GALGANO, LA
GLOBALIZZAZIONE NELLO SPECCHIO DEL DIRITTO (2005); MARIA ROSARIA FERRARESE, DIRITTO
SCONFINATO: INVENTIVA GIURIDICA E SPAZI NEL MONDO GLOBALE (2006) [hereinafter FERRARESE,
DIRRITO SCONFINATO]; MARIA ROSARIA FERRARESE, LE ISTITUZIONI DELLA GLOBALIZZAZIONE:
DIRITTO E DIRITTI NELLA SOCIETÀ TRANSNAZIONALE (2000) [hereinafter FERRARESE, LE ISTITUZIONI],
for a discussion of the effects of globalization on the unification of law.
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Indeed, since states cannot regulate market globalization individually,3 they
delegate or transfer the production of laws to supranational entities.4
The rise of economic globalization has also encouraged forms of
spontaneous uniformization via self-regulation, whereby rules are often drawn
up directly by private entities involved in international trade, such as large
corporations, law firms, and banks––sometimes including “contractual customs
having international value”––which have their own dispute settlement
mechanisms consisting mainly of arbitrators, but with whom national judges
also interact.5 These rules are obviously “transnational,”6 and significantly affect
the sources of law by challenging states’ monopoly on the production of laws
and threatening the hierarchy of legal sources.
The new lex mercatoria is a synthetic expression that refers to this
spontaneous production of law in the global market; it was first used during the
1960s in scientific circles, and eventually became commonly used, despite the
lack of a univocal definition.7 According to famous Italian legal scholar
Francesco Galgano, the expression new lex mercatoria concerns the law created
by the business community without the mediation of the legislative powers of
states; it comprises rules that regulate the commercial relations that are
established within the economic sphere of the markets in a uniform manner
beyond the political units of states.8

3
Until a few years ago the expression “crisis of the State” was commonly used. See, e.g., SABINO
CASSESE, LA CRISI DELLO STATO (2002); Sabino Cassese, L’erosione dello Stato: Una Vicenda
Irreversibile?, in DALLO STATO MONOCLASSE ALLA GLOBALIZZAZIONE 15 (Sabino Cassese & Giuseppe
Guarino eds., 2000); SABINO CASSESE, OLTRE LO STATO (2nd ed. 2006).
4
GALGANO & MARRELLA, supra note 2, at 42 (examining the institutions that work in the area of
international and transnational commerce).
5
See MICHAEL J. BONELL, LE REGOLE OGGETTIVE DEL COMMERCIO INTERNAZIONALE 3–20 (1976)
(discussing law-making by economic actors interested in international commerce); FABRIZIO MARRELLA,
LA NUOVA LEX MERCATORIA, PRINCIPI UNIDROIT ED USI DEI CONTRATTI DEL COMMERCIO
INTERNAZIONALE 261 (2003) (discussing this distinction); René David, Il Diritto del Commercio
Internazionale: Un Nuovo Compito per i Legislatori Nazionali o una Nuova Lex Mercatoria?, 22 RIVISTA
DI DIRITTO CIVILE 577 (1976) (comparing the two ways of unifying the law).
6
FERRARESE, DIRITTO SCONFINATO, supra note 2, at 34, 65 (defining transnational measures);
FERRARESE, LE ISTITUZIONI, supra note 2, at 106 (discussing the difference between international and
transnational).
7
The two paradigmatic theses about the lex mercatoria are ascribable to Bertold Goldman and Clive
Schmitthoff, who are considered the founding fathers of the modern concept of the lex marcatoria.
Besides being instrumental in the revival of lex mercatoria speech, their reconstructions have played a
very important role in the subsequent academic elaboration of international trade law and arbitration. See
Berthold Goldman, Lex Mercatoria, 3 FORUM INTERNATIONALE 3, 3–7 (1983); Clive Schmitthoff, The
Unification of the Law of International Trade, J. BUS. L. 105, 105–09 (1968).
For an examination of the two theories, also identified with the two main approaches followed by the
doctrine, see Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, The Many Lives—and Faces—of Lex Mercatoria: History as
Genealogy in International Business Law, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (Summer 2008). See also LEX
MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1998) (discussing the origins and
development of the theory of lex mercatoria in the literature, legislation, international conventions, and
jurisprudence); FILIP DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX MERCATORIA 207 (1992);
ANTOINE KASSIS, THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE DES USAGES DU COMMERCE: DROIT COMPARÉ, CONTRATS ET
ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAUX, LEX MERCATORIA (1984); FILALI OSMAN, LES PRINCIPES GÈNÉRAUX
DE LA LEX MERCATORIA: CONTRIBUTION À L’ÉTUDE D’UN ORDRE JURIDICQUE ANATIONAL (1992);
LEX MERCATORIA: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW IN HONOUR OF FRANCIS
REYNOLDS (Francis D. Rose ed., 2000).
8
See FRANCESCO GALGANO, LEX MERCATORIA: STORIA DEL D IRITTO C OMMERCIALE 219 (1993);
Francesco Galgano, The New Lex Mercatoria, 2 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 107–08 (1995).
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In spite of the different evaluations of the sources of the lex mercatoria—
which reflect the different ways in which it is perceived—the most commonly
used reconstructions identify the following elements within the lex mercatoria9:
(1) usage and practices of international trade; (2) uniform contractual models;
(3) arbitration case law; and (4) general principles. The modalities whereby the
lex mercatoria is formed evoke the characteristics of customary sources and
raise questions about its role in contemporary State orders, specifically in trade
relations, and with respect to their efficacy within the State.10
The terminology immediately evokes a comparison with the ancient
(medieval) lex mercatoria,11 even though more accepted literature considers
such comparisons as possibly misleading in light of the contextual changes in
the components of the lex mercatoria since medieval times.12 For example, the
9
For an analysis of the sources of law of international trade law, specifically lex mercatoria, see JAN
DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL COMPARATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL AND TRADE
LAW: INTRODUCTION–THE NEW LEX MERCATORIA AND ITS SOURCES 137, 281 (4th ed. 2010); DE LY,
supra note 7, at 207–316 (giving analysis of the sources of law of international trade, specifically lex
mercatoria); GALGANO, supra note 2, at 58–59; MARRELLA, supra note 5; Michael J. Bonell, Lex
Mercatoria, 9 DIGESTO DELLE DISCIPLINE PRIVATISTICHE: SEZIONE DIRITTO COMMERCIALE 11 (1993).
10
See CUSTOMARY LAW AND ECONOMICS (Lisa Bernstein & Francesco Parisi eds., 2014); J. H.
Dalhuisen, Custom and its Revival in Transnational Private Law, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 339
(2008).
11
The "lex mercatoria" (or law merchant) is an expression to indicate the law created by the merchant
community in the late Middle Ages in order to integrate (or overcome) the application of the various local
legal systems, which became inadequate as trade grew and developed. See W.A. BEWES, THE ROMANCE
OF THE LAW MERCHANT: BEING AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL AND
COMMERCIAL LAW WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF THE COMMERCE AND FAIRS OF THE MIDDLE AGES 8–9
(1998).
The first important book on the theme, entitled “Consuetudo, vel, Lex Mercatoria, or, the Ancient
Law Merchant,” was published in 1622 by an English merchant, Gerard Malynes, who wrote in the
introduction: “I have entitled the book according to the ancient name of Lex mercatoria, and not jus
mercatorum because it is a customary Law, approved by the Authority of all Kingdoms and
Commonwealths, and not a Law established by the Sovereignty of any Prince, either in the first
foundation, or in the continuance of time”. This corpus of laws is subject to numerous studies and
criticisms. See, e.g., DE LY, supra note 7, at 15–21; LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE
EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW (1983); FROM LEX MERCATORIA TO COMMERCIAL LAW 53 (Vito
Piergiovanni ed., 2005).
On the traditional theory of the medieval lex mercatoria, see HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND
REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 333–56 (1983); WILLIAM MITCHELL,
ESSAY ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW MERCHANT (1904); Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous
Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J. 644 (1989); Francis M. Burdick, What Is the Law
Merchant?, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 470 (1902).
The idea of a universal merchant law (produced, interpreted, and applied autonomously by the
merchant class) has been included in many commercial law studies and has profoundly influenced the
development of commercial law in the modern era. For a criticism of such theses, see Charles Donahue
Jr., Benvenuto Stracca’s De Mercatura: Was there a Lex Mercatoria in Sixteenth-Century Italy, in FROM
LEX MERCATORIA TO COMMERIAL LAW 70 (Vito Piergiovanni ed., 2005); Charles Donahue, Jr.,
Medieval and Early Modern Lex Mercatoria: An Attempt at the Probatio Diabolica, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L.
21, 35–36 (2004); Emily Kadens, Order Within Law, Variety Within Custom: The Character of the
Medieval Merchant Law, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 39, 56 (2004) [hereinafter Kadens, Order Within Law]; Emily
Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1160 (2012) [hereinafter
Kadens, Myth Customary Law Merchant]; Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern
Distortion of the Medieval ‘Law Merchant,’ 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 685, 690 (2006).
Some other historical reconstructions show that the role of local institutions and “authoritarian” law
has been far from irrelevant or secondary in regulating trade. See Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North &
Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges,
and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990).
12
See generally Adaora Okwor, Lex Mercatoria as Transnational Commercial Law: Is the Lex
Mercatoria Preferentially for the “Mercatocracy”?, in THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HARMONISATION
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ancient lex mercatoria preceded the advent of modern states, while the current
lex mercatoria operates within a world characterized by the dominance of
states,13 with the function of going beyond fragmentation due to the political
division of markets.14
Several authors point out that a distorted use is made of the medieval
experience to legitimize modern aspirations to govern transnational trade
autonomously and independently of any state conditioning:15 in this context the
terminology and comparison with the medieval lex mercatoria would legitimize
the deregulation of the markets,16 and replace the state regulation of international
trade with transnational customary law.17 What matters, therefore, is not what
happened historically, but “what projections into the past align best with present
circumstances and what constructions of the past are used to justify explanations
of the present.”18
The crux of the issue, both in terms of the ancient and the new lex
mercatoria, is not its existence, but the reconstruction of its nature and its
relationship with the “official” system of law19: the criticisms against the
traditional theses are that the ancient lex mercatoria was not completely
autonomous of the official law, but was composed of a set of sources,
procedures, and institutions, among which there was continuous competition and
interchange.20
In this regard, the thesis of Michael J. Bonell seems to be quite realistic; he
states that the economic forces engaged in international trade may have their
own rules due to the fact that in this area states have largely waived the
imposition of their legislation, granting individual economic operators wide
powers of contractual autonomy and attributing effective quasi-legislation to
393 (Mads Andenas & Camilla Baasch Andersen eds., 2011) (comparing the new and the old lex
mercatoria).
13
See FERRARESE, LE ISTITUZIONI, supra note 2, at 149–50 (describing the differences in the
economic and legal contexts that undermine a comparison between the “ancient” and the “new” lex
mercatoria).
14
See GALGANO, supra note 2, at 57 (emphasizing the fact that the new lex mercatoria affects the
legal system of the State).
15
Hatzimihail, supra note 7, at 169; Sachs, supra note 11, at 690 (arguing that the historical
experience of medieval merchant law has been misunderstood and misused in order to legitimize
“political ends”).
16
Scholars of various disciplines have been clinging to the lex mercatoria story for decades as
indisputable evidence that the private order can work. The use of lex mercatoria in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries would thus have a strong symbolic value to give historic legitimacy to economic and
political theories about how law is or should be created. See Kadens, Myth Customary Law Merchant,
supra note 11, at 1153.
17
For years, historians have sought evidence of the existence of a mercantile legal system independent
from state systems as a solution to the contemporary problems of international trade. The revival in the
twentieth century of the lex mercatoria is thus linked to the attempt to conceive a system of this type as
a solution to the legal problems created by cross-border trade and as replacement of complicated doctrines
of “conflict of laws.” See Sachs, supra note 11, 688, 808, 811.
18
Hatzimihail, supra note 7, at 173.
19
Some scholars consider the lex mercatoria’s legal basis as being anchored to the state system
(Schmitthoff is one of the supporters of this theory), while others qualify the lex mercatoria as a legal
system independent of the state and international legal systems (Goldman is one of the supporters of this
theory). Others consider the debate on the independence of the lex mercatoria to be irrelevant. See
Goldman, supra note 7; Schmitthoff, supra note 7. See generally Peter J. Mazzacano, The Lex Mercatoria
as Autonomous Law, 4 COMP. RES. L. & POL. ECON. 1 (2008).
20
For a very useful analysis, see Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 454 (2007). See also Kadens, Order Within Law, supra note 11.
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uses developed within their respective traffic areas. For this reason, the fate of
lex mercatoria continues to depend on the smaller or larger space that States
intend to confer on the power of self-regulation of individuals.21
II. CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THE LEX MERCATORIA AND NEED FOR A “PUBLIC LAW
DIMENSION”

The lex mercatoria has recently raised many doubts, because through this
system of law, strong parties have imposed rules that are congenial to them,
skirting around the principles of the rule of law—as they have been conceived
in civil law systems—which are expressed in specific sources of law. The
phenomena described present a series of negative effects in themselves22 that do
not remain confined to the international level, but have significant consequences
for states, including tax issues regarding cross-border trade transactions and
multinational companies, and citizens’ rights.
The recent financial crisis and the severe repercussions it has had on national
systems—caused primarily by the financial market—has revealed the risks of
deregulation and the need to recover a “public law dimension”23 aimed at
establishing private regulation, instead of a “global law without a State.”24 This
doctrine certainly advocates the reformulation of the hierarchical and vertical
concepts of normativity in light of horizontal processes and mutual recognition,
but also argues that fundamental rights and common interests should be taken
into account, as stated in the principles of liberal-democratic constitutionalism.25
The demands for a re-evaluation of the public sphere and the reconciliation
of particular interests with general interests certainly call into play the role of
states and international organizations, and questions their position regarding the
production of norms associated with globalization.

21

Bonell, supra note 9, at 16.
Many doubts have been raised about the content and nature of lex mercatoria, which could be used
by private powers to their own advantage. See, e.g., Michael Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First
Twenty-Five Years, 4 ARB. INT’L 86 (1988); D’ALBERTI, supra note 2, at 135 n.133 (the lex mercatoria
is “structurally inclined” to favor big companies and the mercantile logic; i. International trade law clearly
favours economic interests to the detriment of the public interest, social values, and human rights).
23
Armin von Bogdandy & Sergio Dellavalle, The Lex Mercatoria of Systems Theory: Localisation,
Reconstruction and Criticism from a Public Law Perspective, 4 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 59, 70–82
(2012).
24
Id. at 74. By reviewing the main theories that historically have proposed the idea of a global order
formed by private actors, these two scholars demonstrate that private law interactions have always taken
place in a context of general interest and that the idea of common good has ensured the primacy of the
rules of public law and institutions in case of conflict. Thus, modern theories differ widely from the
foregoing, as they argue that a global order can develop solely on the self-regulated transnational activities
of private actors and independently from public institutions. These theories, for the first time, support the
idea of a social order without institutional or regulatory reference to a public sphere, a general interest, or
an idea of common good. One of the most well-known theses, among the attempts to provide theoretical
support to this idea, has been elaborated by Gunther Teubner using the conceptual premise of system
theory. See Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW
WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997) (identifying in the lex mercatoria a legal autopoietic
system capable of establishing a self-referential and global economic system that would be a Global Law
Without a State).
25
Bogdandy & Dellavalle, supra note 23, at 82.
22
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The proliferation of supranational bodies and authorities having the function
of governing the global economy26 has, in recent years, stimulated a lively
debate about global politics and the need to safeguard the rule of law in the
globalized system (e.g., rights of participation, democracy, fundamental right
protection).27 It has become commonly recognized that even in a globalized
context, states may still need to play a significant role in guaranteeing and
protecting the rule of law, requiring the characteristics of constitutionalism,
which may be accomplished directly through domestic law or indirectly through
instruments of international law or forms of supranational associations, such as
the European Union (EU).28
The real critical node arising from these considerations is therefore the
‘attitude’ of the bodies—states and intergovernmental organizations—that are
the expression of the public dimension toward the lex mercatoria. This attitude
may be identified by analyzing the sources of law, whereby it is possible to
understand the effects of the lex mercatoria on states and its relationship with
state law. Although this analyzation is not a formal question, it is highly
demonstrative of, and strictly linked to, the rule of law, the democratic system,
and the protection of rights.
The lex mercatoria’s influence on the legal orders of states has led other
experts to maintain that its efficacy is partly the result of the open sovereignty
of states, and partly depends on its transnational nature, which does not allow
states to exercise any form of control over it. Some experts’ assertions survive
scrutiny from economic and sociological standpoints but, from a purely legal or
constitutional standpoint, such statements require a dogmatic foundation in
positive law. In a public or constitutional perspective, it is necessary to verify
the efficacy attributed to this transnational law in states’ constitutional systems
by analyzing the openness of the new form of the democratic, pluralistic state
vis-à-vis its various legal sources.29
The attitude of the European Union and its member states towards the lex
mercatoria, is discussed in this paper through a public or constitutional law
approach by analyzing the relationship between sources of law. In this way, it is
possible to examine its impact on the rule of law, on the guarantee of democracy,
and the protection of fundamental rights in the European context.

26
See SABINO CASSESE, CHI GOVERNA IL MONDO? 15 (2013) (analyzing the plurality of
intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies operating in the supranational context).
27
Id. These are the studies of ‘global administrative law’ to which many scholars have contributed.
See Global Administrative Law, INST. FOR INT’L LAW & JUSTICE, http://www.iilj.org/gal/ (last visited
Apr. 2, 2018).
28
See Natalino Irti, Le Categorie Giuridiche della Globalizzazione, 48 RIVISTA DI DRITTO CIVILE
625, 633 (2002) (supporting the fundamental role that states should play in a globalized context).
29
See GABRIELLA SAPUTELLI, STATO, UNIONE EUROPEA E LEX MERCATORIA (2015); Gabriella
Saputelli, The Role of Customary Law and the New Lex Mercatoria in Countries with a Civil Law
Tradition: The Italian Case, 25 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. & PROBS. 257 (2016).

2018

THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE MEMBER STATES, AND THE LEX MERCATORIA

7

III. STATE AND LEX MERCATORIA: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

A brief historic overview can help to solve these questions by describing
how the role of customary transnational law has changed as the form of states
have evolved.30 The choice of a source system, in fact, constitutes a variable that
depends on the form of the state, as evidenced by the arrangements that sources
of law have had throughout history in those various forms.31 The form of a state
in this sense signifies the relationship between authority and freedom and the
openness to phenomena occurring outside of the state’s borders.
A historic survey shows that the general legal system has always attempted
to delimit and reduce the efficacy of spontaneously formed law—that, in most
cases, has taken on the form of usage and customs. In observing the relationships
between the main sources of law in some medieval legal systems, various
attempts to delimit the efficacy of customs, or to establish an overriding role of
the political sources over it, can be identified.
With the gradual concentration of the power of imperio [full authority], the
law has become inseparably tied to the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty,
unlike other manifestations of power—such as the executive or judicial
powers—has been associated mainly with the power of law-making. In the
sixteenth century, Jean Bodin explained that the sovereign is the supreme
legislator because he has the power to modify the law and is the ultimate legal
authority to which all the others are subordinate.32
At that time, the advent of the state created deep changes in the way social
groups were organized, which caused a deep fracture in the legal tradition. It
reduced the efficacy of spontaneous forms of laws—those produced directly by
the social group through usage and customs—and enhanced the role of political
sources, which emanate from a political authority. From the assertion of this new
form of political organization, the degree of closure of the legal order—from the
standpoint of the production of laws and the relationship between imposed
sources and sources arising from the social sphere—has become closely related
to the form of the state that came about in a given historic moment.
Under the liberal state, at least in Europe, the legal order became selfsufficient and the political sources of law prevailed over customary law. Ever
since, the efficacy of customary law within a state cannot be derived from the
imposition of this phenomenon, irrespective of an evaluation—albeit implicit—
30
For this historical overview, see generally CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING (4th ed.
1946); J.H. BAKER, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: LAWYERS, BOOKS AND THE LAW (2000); BERMAN,
supra note 11; MARIO CARAVALE, ALLE ORIGINI DEL DIRITTO EUROPEO (2005); 2 ADRIANO CAVANNA,
STORIA DEL DIRITTO MODERNO IN EUROPA (2006); CARLO M. CIPOLLA, STORIA ECONOMICA
DELL’EUROPA PREINDUSTRIALE (1974); JOHN K.GALBRAITH, STORIA DELL’ECONOMIA (1990); PAOLO
GROSSI, SOCIETÀ, DIRITTO, STATO: UN RECUPERO PER IL DIRITTO (2006); J.M. KELLY, A SHORT
HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 139 (1992); TRAKMAN, supra note 11; Bruce L. Benson, The
Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J. 644 (1989)
31
See Adolf Merkl, Prolegomeni ad una Teoria della Costruzione a Gradi del Diritto, in IL DUPLICE
VOLTO DEL DIRITTO: IL SISTEMA KELSENIANO E ALTRI SAGGI 8 (C. Geraci ed., 1987) (stating that the
form of the state is fundamental for the system of sources of law, because some peculiar sources of law
are linked to some forms of State).
32
Jean Bodin was one of the most important proponents of the theory of sovereignty in the sixteenth
century. In his famous book, Les Six Livres de la Republique, originally published in 1583, he explained
that it is in the nature of every independent State to have supreme legislative powers. See generally JEAN
BODIN, LES SIX LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE (Scientia Verlag 1977) (1583).
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of the phenomenon by the state. This new form of political organization had
some unique characteristics that set it apart from other legal orders, such as
exclusiveness and impenetrability, which materialized in a state monopoly of
law-making and was representative of one of the main features of sovereignty.
In Europe, this process coincided with the codifying experiences, between
the end of the fifteenth and first-half of the eighteenth centuries, which led to the
drafting of official customary law texts. Additionally, statutes issued by
representatives in Parliaments delimited the efficacy of customary law,
downgrading it to the status of a residual source of law.
Common law systems, referred to often as a paradigm of legal orders in
which primary importance is attached to customary law, were no exception to
this evolution. A closer analysis reveals that the efficacy of usage and practices
undergo a conditioning that is similar to what occurs in civil law systems, as a
result of the importance initially taken on by case law and, in more recent times,
statutory law.
These outcomes are confirmed by other studies that furnish proof of
continuity in the history of the public regulation of the economy—albeit with
different modalities, instruments and intensity of regulation—and show that not
even contemporary times are characterized by the end or the decline of the action
of public authorities in the discipline of the economy.33

IV. THE CONTEMPORARY STATE AND THE LEX MERCATORIA

In the Italian system, there are no provisions that explicitly and formally
authorize the lex mercatoria to produce effects within it; however, a series of
elements allow for an indirect and implicit opening to it. As stated earlier, the
sources of the new lex mercatoria correspond to some modalities of law making
which are recognized by the legal systems of various states. These circumstances
allow the lex mercatoria, even without the explicit acknowledgment by a state,
to produce effects within the domestic order through the space reserved for
customary law and private autonomy. In these cases, the lex mercatoria can
never contradict the legislative order because of the hierarchical position of the
sources of law which opens the door to transnational law.
The specific structure of the pluralist-democratic state, which is an evolution
of the liberal state, commands new reflections. Specifically, its opening to
international law may have a direct impact on its system of sources of law and
may partially change the approaches inherited from the structure of the liberal
state. An example is the new wording of Article 117, Paragraph 1 of the Italian
Constitution, which proposes that the domestic sources of law are subordinate
to “the constraints deriving from EU legislation and international obligations,”34
resulting in different consequences and control modalities. Under this Article,
any opening towards the lex mercatoria by the EU and international sources of

See, e.g., D’ALBERTI, supra note 2, at 141 (giving a description of the characteristics of public
regulation in contemporary times and an excursus of the transformations that have occurred throughout
history).
34
Art. 117, para 1, Costituzione [Const.] (It.).
33
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law, particularly international agreements, may lead to such law merging with
Italy’s domestic law.
Clauses of this type could enable custom-formed, spontaneous law to make
its way into national law through international and European sources. A practical
effect of this merging is that the customs of international trade, which represent
a considerable portion of the lex mercatoria, acquire weight and authority that
do not correspond to the ranking of customs in the domestic hierarchical system
of law. The incorporation mechanism is always usage and practice secundum
legem [according to the law] that springs into motion when a source refers to
customs for the integration of its content.35 According to the most common
reconstruction, through this mechanism, custom will take on the same regulatory
force and position in the hierarchical scale as the sources that cite it—deriving
its authority purely from cross-referencing.36
The efficacy of transnational usage and practices is due to the prevalence of
EU and international law over the system of domestic sources, which may lead
to the overcoming of an explicit prohibition contained in a state or regional
statute. This effect could pass through provisions of European ‘private’ law and
European private international law, or EU trade agreements,37 especially
considering that the EU has an exclusive competence in trade matters.38
The peculiarities of the pluralist democratic state allow for interaction
between different regulatory processes (official and spontaneous), and an
interchange of rules functional with the demands that come from trade relations,
thus making the legal system amenable to those needs.39 At the same time, the
pluralist democratic state has instruments to control and ensure the protection of
rights and intertwining of interests—factors which are considered to be
distinctive features of constitutionalism. Reference is being made here to the
control over public order implemented by every judge, and to the control of
constitutionality enforced by constitutional courts.
As a limitation to the prevalence of international and European law, the
Italian and German Constitutional Courts have provided the counter-limits
doctrine in case of violation of the fundamental principles of their respective
Constitutions.40

35
See Alessandro Pizzorusso, Fonti (sistema costituzionale delle), in 6 DIGESTO DISCIPLINE
PUBBLICISTICHE 429 (1991).
36
ALFREDO ROCCO, PRINCIPII DI DIRITTO COMMERCIALE: PARTE GENERALE 137 (1928).
37
See, e.g., Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, EU-CA, Oct. 28, 2016, O.J. (L 11) 60;
Resolution 2014/2228 of the European Parliament of 8 July 2015 containing the European Parliament’s
recommendations
to
the
European
Commission
on
the
negotiations
for
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 2017 O.J. (C 265) 5.
38
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 3, Oct. 26, 2012,
2012 O.J. (C 326) 51 [hereinafter TFEU]. Considered as one of the most important sectors of the European
Union, the common commercial policy has been characterized from the beginning as an exclusive
competence of the Community, although its wide scope and evolution have raised issues of competence
between States and Community.
39
Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y
627, 627 (Aug. 2006) (stating that “[n]ational legal systems have adapted to the Lex Mercatoria, thereby
enhancing the latter’s autonomy, and the EU has begun to move in the same direction.”).
40
See Stelio Mangiameli, Unchangeable Core Elements of National Constitutions and the Process
of European Integration. For a Criticism of the Theory of the “Controlimiti” (Counter-limits /SchrankenSchranken), in 1 TEORIA DEL DIRITTO E DELLO STATO 68 (2010).
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The use of the counter-limits doctrine to prevent the efficacy of European
and international law is often considered a remote hypothesis, but some recent
constitutional court judgments demonstrate that this control can always be
activated. For example, we can mention for Germany: the Lissabon Urteil case
of 2009,41 and the 2010 Mangold case concerning EU law,42 and for Italy: the
2014 case of the Italian Constitutional Court in which the Court prevented an
international custom from entering into the domestic order through the abovementioned constitutional provisions.43
The control claimed by these Constitutional Courts over European law and
international customary law demonstrate that it is always the state that allows or
rejects the efficacy of laws produced by external sources of law in domestic legal
systems. The breadth of this control will of course depend on developments in
international and European law.
Therefore, it can be stated that the inclusion of constitutional provisions that
allow the opening of the domestic order does not imply a retreat of the state in
the exercise of sovereign functions but, on the contrary, it presupposes them.44
The approach described considers the judge—namely the person who
interprets national law and confirms the efficacy of the phenomena that produces
transnational rules—as main guarantor of the rule of law and reflects the role
that judges are increasingly playing in the contemporary system. By carrying out
this function, the judge may also use many instruments provided by the
internationalization or Europeanization of fundamental rights that arguably
offset the loss of sovereignty that commonly follows globalization. This
approach tends to bring the continental system closer to the common law system,
but it is not sufficient in civil law systems, where remedies require an evaluation
by representative bodies as they cannot be left solely in the hands of the judges.
However, it is almost evident that in a globalized context, the role of states is
still important but not sufficient. Supranational organizations are better suited
for this role than states, which are no longer capable of regulating the global
economy alone, as they did in the past.

V. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE LEX MERCATORIA IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

In the European context, the prevalence of EU law and EU competence in
trade matters show that the EU has become the main forum for the dialogue
between law and market. In order to re-establish a public law dimension, an

41
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], June 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08,
http://www.bverfg.de/e/es20090630_2bve000208en.html.
42
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], July 6, 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06,
http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20100706_2bvr266106en.html.
43
Corte Const., 22 ottobre 2014, n. 238, G.U. 2014, I, 45, 1 (It.). See also, Sentenza n. 238 anno
2014, CONSULTA ONLINE, http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/2014/0238s-14.html (last visited Apr. 2,
2018) (providing numerous comments on the judgment).
44
Adele Anzon Demming, Principio Democratico e Controllo di Costituzionalità sull’integrazione
Europea nella “Sentenza Lissabon” del Tribunale Costituzionale Federale Tedesco, 2009
GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE 5213, 5243–44.
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equilibrium needs to be found at the EU level between the rule of law and free
markets (thus far guaranteed by the state).
This conclusion is even more important if we consider the peculiarities of
the EU market compared to the global market, as emerges from Article 3,
paragraph 3 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU):
The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for
the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced
economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive
social market economy, aiming at full employment and social
progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of
the quality of the environment.45
On the one hand, the European legal system is progressively oriented to
achieving a balance between economic freedoms and other rights and public
interests;46 on the other hand, it leaves Member States the opportunity to balance
interests and to limit “economic freedoms in the name of public interests, social
values and other fundamental rights.”47.
It is meaningful that Article 3, paragraph 3 of the TEU mentions the social
market economy which refers to a model of economic theory developed in
Germany by the Freiburg school, according to that model the needs of the market
“must be balanced and integrated with those of social policy,” although the
context is that of a "strongly competitive” market economy.48
The Lisbon Treaty49 has also strengthened the EU's role and competences
in international trade and limited the action of Member States, which lose the
power to undertake unilateral initiatives outside the common framework50—
even if limits on the exercise of competence in the area of common commercial
policy are confirmed, such as in the reference to the principle of allocation in
Article 207, paragraph 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of Europe Union
(TFEU).51

45
Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union, art. 3, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C.
326) 17 [hereinafter TEU].
46
D’ALBERTI, supra note 2, at 110, 125, 145, 116, 133 (underlying the disproportion of the law of
the global economy compared to the EU which allows for a balance of interests).
47
Id. at 119 (showing some examples of limitations to competition rules).
48
L. Fumagalli, Art. 3 TUE, in TRATTATI DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA 15, 18 (Antonio Tizzano ed.,
2014). See Karl Peter Sommermann, Article 3: The Objectives of the European Union, in THE TREATY
ON EUROPEAN UNION (TEU): A COMMENTARY 157, 172–73 (Herman-Josef Blanke & Stelio Mangiameli
eds., 2013) (providing an analysis of the expression “social market economy”).
49
Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.
50
See G. CONTALDI, Art. 206 TFUE, in TRATTATI DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA, supra note 48, at 1701,
1704; Alessandra Mignolli, La Politica Commerciale Comune, in L’ORDINAMENTO EUROPEO: LE
POLITICHE DELL’UNIONE 133, 179 (Stelio Mangiameli ed., 2008).
51
TFEU, supra note 38 art. 207, ¶ 6 (“The exercise of the competences conferred by this Article in
the field of common commercial policy shall not affect the delimitation of competences between the
Union and the Member States, and shall not lead to the harmonisation of legislative or regulatory
provisions of the Member States in so far as the Treaties exclude such harmonisation.”). See Andrea
Caligiuri, Art. 207 TFUE, in TRATTATI DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA, supra note 48, at 1706, 1706 (discussing
problems related to the division of competences).
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The role of the EU in the globalized context also appears in Article 21,
paragraph 2 of the TEU:
The Union shall define and pursue common policies and
actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all
fields of international relations, in order to . . . encourage the
integration of all countries into the world economy, including
through the progressive abolition of restrictions on
international trade. . .52
For these reasons, the relationship between political (or institutional) sources of
law and spontaneous sources of law must be found at the EU level. Also in the
EU the efficacy of spontaneous sources of law cannot be derived irrespective of
an explicit or implicit evaluation by the EU through sources of law.
The goal of creating a common market has prompted the need to harmonize,
standardize, and unify the law of the various European countries, resulting in
some advantages for member states’ regulation of globalization effects. Even
though this was not the original aim of the European order,53 the creation of a
single market has indirectly controlled and reduced spontaneous sources of law
by market operators in a given geographic area.
An examination of the European legal system through some significant
indicators—the marginal role of spontaneous, customary, sources of law by EU
law; European Court of Justice case law about the lex mercatoria;54 choice of
law in European private international law;55 the consideration of customary law
by the European private law proposals of the Principles of European Contract
Law and the Common European Sales Law56—shows the attitude of the EU
legislator toward sources of lex mercatoria. This attitude, while open in some
cases—as indicated by references to transnational customary sources of law seen

52
TEU, supra note 45, art. 21, ¶ 2(e). See also Stefan Oeter, Art. 21 TUE: The Principles and
Objectives of the Union’s External Action, in THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (TEU): A
COMMENTARY, supra note 48, at 833, 861.
53
The original purpose of the European integration process was the peaceful cooperation between
states after the Second World War. See The History of the European Union, European Union,
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en (last visited Apr. 23, 2018).
54
See Case C-87/10, Electrosteel Europe SA v. Edil Centro SpA, 2011 E.C.R. I-04987 (recognizing
the importance of ‘uses’ in international trade, the Court refers to the codified version of Incoterms for
the interpretation of contractual legal relations governed by European law). This case demonstrates that
EU law is permeable to the customs of international trade. However, it must be underlined that in the
same decision, the Court implies that the “European Union legislature” can always exclude the application
of commercial customs, or provide for their delimitation to specific issues.
55
See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable
to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), COM (2005) 650 final (Dec. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Rome I]
(debating Regulation 593/2008 on the modification of “Article 3 – Freedom of choice,” the Commission
remarked that “[t]o further boost the impact of the parties’ will, a key principle of the Convention,
paragraph 2 authorises the parties to choose as the applicable law a non-State body of law. The form of
words used would authorise the choice of the UNIDROIT principles, the Principles of European Contract
Law or a possible future optional Community instrument, while excluding the lex mercatoria, which is
not precise enough, or private codifications not adequately recognised by the international community.”).
56
THE COMM’N ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PARTS
I AND II. (Ole Lando, Hugh Beale eds., 1999); Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council on a Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final (Oct. 11, 2011).
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in the judgment of the European Court of Justice57—is more restrictive in others,
as illustrated by the reaffirmation of the prevalence of other sources of European
law, as in the debate on the Rome I Regulation.58
These circumstances suggest that regulatory strategies are no longer the
remit of states—which are unable to regulate or limit the phenomenon as they
did in the past—but are produced by more complex entities that are now the
main interlocutors of globalization.
For these reasons, it is possible to conclude that in a global market, a
stronger EU could help guarantee the rule of law in the European context; the
EU can help recover and defend the ‘public dimension’ in a globalized context59
by ensuring that the balancing of interests involves not only judicial bodies, but
also includes legislative bodies that represent these interests.
A guarantee-based approach of this type requires that the limits inherent in
the EU order be solved: firstly, the limits inherent in the EU’s role in the global
context, and its relationship with international actors, states, large corporations,
and lobbies; secondly, the well-known limits related to the EU institutional
structure and process: transparency of the EU decision-making process,
democratic deficit and accountability.60
Two recent important documents show that the EU is achieving awareness
in this direction. First, in a 2016 opinion by the European Court of Justice, the
Court stated that the provisions of the free trade agreement with Singapore
relating to non-direct foreign investment and those relating to dispute settlement
between investors and States do not fall within the exclusive competence of the
EU, so that the agreement could not be concluded by the EU alone without the
participation of the Member States; it can, as it stands, only be concluded by the
EU and the Member States jointly.61
In the second, in their “Reflection Paper on Harnessing Globalization,” the
European Commission seems to discount the excessive use of dispute settlement
through arbitration, noting that “[d]isputes should no longer be decided by
arbitrators under the so-called Investor to State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). This
is why the Commission has proposed a Multilateral Investment Court which

57

See, e.g., Case C-87/10, Electrosteel Europe SA v. Edil Centro SpA, 2011 E.C.R. I-04987
Rome I, supra note 55.
59
See BECK, supra note 1, at 157, 189 (explaining that globalization does not determine the end of
politics but opens a new era for it. The author’s analysis focuses on the importance of international
cooperation, stating that there is no national way-out from the trap of globalization. An institution such
as the European Union could restore the priority of politics, a stronger social and economic capability for
cooperating States, under democratic control. A stronger and democratic European Union could use its
power as the world's largest trading power to introduce effective reforms both internally and externally).
See also ULRICH BECK, POTERE E CONTROPOTERE NELL’ETÀ GLOBALE 216, 323 (C. Sandrelli trans.,
2010) (examining the State’ strategies between renationalisation and transnationalization, as well as the
change in the concept of the form of state and politics).
60
See Giuliano Amato, Poteri e Sovranità nel Mondo Globale, ASSOCIAZIONE ITALIANA DEI
COSTITUZIONALISTI,
http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/download/jb5kPXP4zinecEqMjPk9qB0umYRDCtO2gD1
LlUOeL-c/relazione-amato.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2018) (discussing the different paths that can be
followed in order to control the powers acting in the global arena, which may merge into a supranational
governance framework organized according to democratic rules).
61
Case C-2/15, Request for an Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU — Conclusion of the Free
Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore — Allocation of
competences between the European Union and the Member States, 2016 E.C.J. 992.
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would create a fair and transparent mechanism and is being discussed with our
partners.”62
The Commission underlines the important role of the EU on the global
scene, and its intention to manage globalization, noting that “outside the EU, an
effective European economic diplomacy will help write the global rulebook and
ensure that European companies can prosper in fast-growing international
markets,” and that the EU has “the opportunity to shape globalization in line
with [their] own values and interests.”63 These objectives require a revision of
the European structure and strong cooperation between the EU and Member
States. Recognizing the continued role of states in the global market, the
Commission concludes that “harnessing globalization therefore starts at home”
and that “EU institutions cannot do this alone: this must be a joint endeavor of
the EU and its Member States.”64

62

See Reflection Paper on Harnessing Globalisation COM (2017) 240 final (May, 10, 2017)
(footnotes omited).
63
Id.
64
Id.

